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ESSAY

Armed Conflict at the Threshold?
DEBORAH PEARLSTEIN*
Seventeen years into the United States’ engagement in what America has
controversially understood as a global, non-international armed conflict against a shifting
set of terrorist groups, a growing array of scholars has called for a reassessment of the
significance of the “armed conflict” classification under international humanitarian law
(IHL). The existence of an “armed conflict” has long been understood as a proxy
on/off switch of inescapable importance. When an “armed conflict” exists, lethal
targeting—without regard to particular self-defensive need or immediacy of threat—is
permitted as a first resort. When an “armed conflict” does not exist, it is not.
Challenging the wisdom of this categorical switch, critics raise a range of concerns: the
line dividing which circumstances count as “armed conflict” and which do not is no
longer clear or stable enough to provide meaningful guidance; current definitions may
compromise humanitarian interests, prospects for criminal justice or both; most
important, the “armed conflict” classification no longer reflects current moral, political,
or strategic sensibilities about the role of lethal force in an age in which global threats
have changed. This Essay contends that while the criticisms are important, they fail on
their own terms to justify the abandonment of “armed conflict” as a proxy determinant
of first-resort killing. More fundamentally, while classification critics recognize acutely
the many changes in the nature of conflict since World War II, they attend far less to
systemic changes in the development of international law during that time. Taking the
“armed conflict” classification debate as a case study, this Essay highlights how critiques
of international law’s substance continue to embrace increasingly outmoded, World
War-II era assumptions about the inadequacy of the international legal system to
address problems inherent in all law: interpretive uncertainty, law violation, and social
change.

* Professor of Law, Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva University. Many thanks to Ryan Goodman,
Monica Hakimi, Kevin Jon Heller, Rebecca Ingber, Marty Lederman, Marko Milanovic, Gabor Rona,
David Sloss, and to all participants in the Second Annual Workshop on the Role of International
Law and National Security, sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy, and the Cardozo Law Institute in Holocaust and
Human Rights, for thoughtful discussions of this project.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To judge by a good number of recent accounts, the modern law of
war, often called the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian
law (IHL), today faces a set of challenges that in very different ways test its
continued salience as the primary source of legal protection for victims in
wartime.1 The post-Cold War period has seen wars involving non-state
actors (non-international armed conflicts, or NIACs) eclipse wars between
states as the primary source of armed conflict in the world,2 a form of
conflict IHL’s Geneva Conventions regulate in only the bare terms of
Common Article 3.3 The advent and expansion of international human
rights law (IHRL) in the years since the modern Geneva Conventions were
drafted may fill the IHL vacuum in such conflicts in some respects,4 but
the post-Geneva development of IHRL equally undermines the long
asserted argument for construing IHL to apply as broadly as possible.
Namely, it challenges the assertion that the application of IHL will
invariably and best advance the protection of humanitarian interests.5 At
the same time, the United States’ now 17-year-old response to the attacks
of September 11 – for the first time proposing the existence of a NIAC
driven by a shifting set of terrorist groups that is not only trans-border but
global in scope – seems counter to another core premise of IHL, that
peace is the normal state of international affairs, and war (and the law that
applies during it) is an exceptional, distinguishable condition.6 Indeed, a
growing set of security scholars maintain, the greatest threat to
humanitarian interests in the world today is no longer necessarily war in
any traditional sense, but rather the technological development and
1. This Essay understands the term international humanitarian law (IHL) as interchangeable
with the term “law of armed conflict,” both of which describe a body of rules contained principally
in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, and in customary international
law regulating conduct during hostilities. For a useful summary of this body of law, see LAURIE R.
BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT (2013); Louise
Doswald-Beck, The right to life in armed conflict: does international humanitarian law provide all the answers?, 88
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 881 (2006).
2. See OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS: HOW A
RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD (2017) (arguing that the decreasing
frequency in international armed conflicts and corresponding rise in non-international armed
conflicts is in part a result of the dramatic success of the formal legal prohibition of aggressive war).
3. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III].
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See, e.g., INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA
CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE
WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶¶ 492-95 (2d ed. 2016) [hereinafter 2016
ICRC COMMENTARY].
6. STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY 279-81(2005)
(tracing this notion from its roots in just war theory to its codification in post-World War II UN
Charter rules).
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proliferation of remotely piloted armed drones, the weaponized use of
cyberspace, and the rapidly developing fields of autonomous,
bioengineered, and non-lethal weaponry – phenomena that transcend
IHL’s fundamental conception of war as happening between
distinguishable combatants and civilians in a defined battlespace.7
Nowhere are the effects of these changes on the role of IHL more
visible than in current debates over the salience of the “armed conflict”
classification – the but-for test IHL establishes as the trigger for its
application. As conventional IHL doctrine has it, the existence of an
“armed conflict” is an on/off switch of inescapable importance. When an
“armed conflict” exists (of international or non-international variety),
lethal targeting, without regard to particular self-defensive need or
immediacy of the threat, is permitted as a first resort. When “armed
conflict” does not exist, it is not.8 Yet, citing one or more of the changes
described above, a growing array of critics today call into question the
wisdom and utility of preserving the “armed conflict” threshold as a proxy
test for the legality of first-resort killing.9
Scholarly critics express an importantly nuanced range of views, and
several authors level more than one form of critique; this Essay suggests
those critiques can be grouped broadly into three categories. The first set
maintains that the “armed conflict” threshold is today irretrievably
indeterminate, that the legal and factual line dividing which circumstances
count as “armed conflict” and which do not is not – or is no longer – clear
or stable enough to provide meaningful guidance on so important a
question.10 While authors have noted uncertainties surrounding the
application of the NIAC classification over the years,11 the subset of
scholars addressed here now leverage that uncertainty to argue for the
rejection of the “armed conflict” trigger altogether.12
The second group of critics worries, conversely, about the armed
conflict threshold’s undue rigidity – arguing that requiring (as IHL does)
some exceptional level of violence before hostilities rise to the level of a
NIAC risks creating law avoidance incentives that can undermine the
achievement of both the basic humanitarian purposes of IHL, and the

7. See, e.g., ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME
EVERYTHING: TALES FROM THE PENTAGON 129-41 (2016).
8. See BLANK AND NOONE, supra note 1.
9. See infra Part I.
10. See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 7; Monika Hakimi, A Functional Approach to Targeting and
Detention, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1365 (2012).
11. See Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 27 (Wilmshurst ed., 2012) (noting that “[i]t is not
always easy to determine when a situation of violence within a State is to be classified as a noninternational armed conflict”).
12. See infra Part II.
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complimentary goals of IHRL.13 Especially in places where rights may be
inadequately protected under other bodies of law (where, for example,
domestic or international human rights laws are underdeveloped or
unobserved, or criminal justice systems dysfunctional), ensuring that IHL’s
basic constraining legal guidance is triggered sooner rather than later is
essential to maximizing compliance with humanitarian protections.
The final group of critics questions the materiality of the “armed
conflict” distinction at all, contending that the “armed conflict” proxy
serves only to interfere with or prevent direct focus on the considerations
that should really matter in the justification of lethal force. Indeed, some
contend, the most important contemporary controversies over lethal
targeting – involving a threat posed by a loosely organized group or
individual, able to operate beyond the reach of other existing legal
authorities – involve circumstances in which the application of either IHL
or IHRL produces the same result. In the cases where legal questions most
arise, this argument goes, both IHL and IHRL require context-dependent
analyses turning on the degree of danger posed and the necessity of
responding with lethal force.14 States and scholars should be debating what
those contexts are – including potentially shifting their substantive effect –
rather than conducting a meta-analysis of whether the context is an
“armed conflict” as such.
The developments these critics cite as motivating their concerns are
manifestly real, and in an important sense, do put pressure on assumptions
at the core of the humanitarian bargain on which IHL is based. That
bargain flowed from the notion that both individuals and states were
getting, for some limited period, a benefit they otherwise lacked. Where
the law of war had for centuries been geared toward ensuring reciprocal
fairness between contending states, the humanitarian revolution
undergirding modern IHL traded legal acknowledgment of the privilege of
belligerent parties to kill in the limited circumstance of war (even at a time
when the law was moving away from war as a legitimate tool of state
power) for the legal requirement that warring parties mitigate the suffering
of individuals then otherwise wholly lacking legal protection.15 But the
proliferation in the 1980s and 1990s of generally applicable international
human rights law today makes it impossible to argue that individuals are
otherwise wholly lacking in legal protection. And while the phenomenon
of transnational terrorism of course well predates 2001,16 the more novel
notion that sporadic acts of international terrorism might be part of a
13. See infra Part II.
14. See BROOKS, supra note 7; Hakimi, supra note 10.
15. See NEFF, supra note 6, at 340 (and sources cited).
16. See AUDREY KURTH CRONIN, HOW TERRORISM ENDS: UNDERSTANDING THE DECLINE
AND DEMISE OF TERRORIST CAMPAIGNS 3-6 (2011).
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transnational “armed conflict” makes it difficult to conceive of a time
when belligerent states would ever lack the privilege to kill.
At the same time, each critique depends not only on accepting a
particular – at best debatable – characterization of the law as it exists, but
also, more implicitly, on embracing a set of longstanding assumptions
about the deficits of international law writ large. As this Essay argues in
successive parts below, each of the critiques is vulnerable to rebuttal on its
own terms. The critiques may also be faulted for largely-unreconstructed
reliance on expectations of international law’s indeterminacy, the weak
mechanisms for accountability under international law, and relative
inadaptability to change – assessments that no longer accurately describe
multiple areas of international law and are increasingly inapt for the bodies
of law implicated here. For the changes driving the reassessment of the
“armed conflict” classification do not occur in a vacuum of post-World
War II developments. Where the lack of a singular international court of
compulsory jurisdiction may once have been sufficient evidence to
establish the international system’s inability to deal with law’s
indeterminacy, the post-War era has shown how a distributed network of
credible domestic and international judicial fora can perform the same
function of interpretive settlement, helping to fill out the meaning of that
long-contested idea. Informal interpretive mechanisms can likewise help
shift understandings of legal meaning as more formal institutions gear up
to address contemporary problems of social change. A similar
phenomenon of distributed justice should likewise help mitigate concerns
about particular gaps in international enforcement.
In the end, while current critiques of the “armed conflict”
classification have been framed as emergent problems unique to IHL, this
Essay suggests that they are better understood as categorical problems
endemic in, even characteristic of, the evolutionary nature of all law in
times of change. Far from illustrating IHL’s inadequacy in the face of
current threats, the “armed conflict” critiques noted above may be better
understood as indicators of IHL’s maturation, both as a substantive body
of law, and as part of an increasingly developed international legal system.

II. THE INDETERMINACY CRITIQUE
While domestic legal theory has long recognized among fundamental
jurisprudential truisms the reality that all law proves ambiguous in certain
applications – including, famously, a simple law banning vehicles in the
park17 – the management of legal indeterminacy has proven much more
17. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607–08
(1958) (“A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park. Plainly this forbids an
automobile, but what about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles? What about airplanes? . . . There
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vexing to scholars of international law. Overwhelming conventional
wisdom among post-World War II scholars compared international law
unfavorably with its domestic law cousins for its relative lack of secondary
rules and processes by which international legal rules can be identified, and
legal meaning authoritatively settled.18 As H.L.A. Hart famously explained
in his canonical 1961 work, “The Concept of Law,” legal systems generally
cure “uncertainty” through institutions and agreed-upon processes to say
what the law is, “either by reference to an authoritative text or to an
official [or institution, like the legislature or courts] whose declarations on
this point are authoritative.”19 The absence of such institutions in
international law – post-War-era scholars typically contemplated a central,
authoritative international court of compulsory jurisdiction – has long
been the source of “pessimism about whether the international system can
ever hope to achieve the level of consensus and certainty that is thought to
characterize well-developed systems of domestic law.”20
Yet while substantive international law, and the legal institutions
through which it is interpreted and applied, have changed dramatically
since the emergence of the international law indeterminacy critique, that
decades-old assessment remains visible in a wide swath of international law
literature, not least in contemporary debates about the utility of the
category “armed conflict.” This part describes the way in which the
indeterminacy critique arises in contemporary “armed conflict” debates,
then argues that, to the extent it may be applicable earlier or elsewhere in
international law, it is no longer compelling here. For even assuming the
absence of a central, authoritative international court of compulsory
jurisdiction governing all matters IHL, part of the post-war lessons learned
in this realm has been to demonstrate how a distributed system of judicial
decision-makers can achieve a comparable settlement effect.

A. Understanding the Debate
The complexity of determining when violence involving non-state
actors crosses the threshold from ordinary crime or protest to something
on the scale of war has been apparent to the IHL of NIACs from the
beginning. The text of Common Article 3 (setting forth the core IHL
protections in NIACs) is famously silent on what counts as an “armed
must be a core of settled meaning, but there will be, as well, a penumbra of debatable cases in which
words are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out.”).
18. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209 (1961).
19. Id. at 90. “Disputes as to whether an admitted rule has or has not been violated will always
occur…if there is no agency specially empowered to ascertain finally, and authoritatively, the fact of
violation.” Id. at 91.
20. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public
Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1802 (2009).
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conflict not of an international character,”21 a silence borne of negotiators’
failure (either in connection with that article or later in Additional Protocol
II elaborating on the law of NIAC) to agree on how to distinguish an
“armed conflict” from any lesser “act committed by force of arms.”22
From the outset of treaty negotiations, it was clear that Common Article 3
NIACs were meant to encompass internal armed conflicts or civil wars,
which had not been plainly covered by the Geneva regime until the
modern Conventions of 1949. Beyond this, however, states were
concerned. While accepting the need to ensure basic humanitarian
protections in the bloody civil wars that had ravaged multiple states in the
decades before the modern Conventions were ratified, states continued to
view the management of lesser forms of violence as at the core of
sovereign discretion. Among the risks states perceived: “ordinary
criminals” would be “encouraged to give themselves a semblance of
organization as a pretext for claiming the benefit of the Convention,
representing their crimes as ‘acts of war’ in order to escape [criminal]
punishment for them.”23
Notwithstanding such concerns, negotiators in the end rejected
limiting language that would have rendered Common Article 3 expressly
applicable only to “cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of
religion.”24 They likewise rejected the notion of codifying formal criteria
for determining whether violence had reached the level of armed conflict –
criteria, for example, including whether the non-state actor had an
“organized military force,” with “an authority responsible for its acts;” and
whether the legal government “recognized the insurgents as belligerents,”
and was “obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces” in
response.25 While acknowledging the proposed criteria as “convenient”
but not “obligatory,” the influential International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) Commentaries ultimately urged that “the scope of the
Article must be as wide as possible” for the purpose of maximizing
humanitarian protection.26

21. Geneva III, supra note 3.
22. INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY IV GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 35-36 (Jean S. Pictet ed.,
Ronald Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958); see also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T,
Judgment ¶ 562 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) (describing the need for
factors to distinguish a NIAC from “banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist
activities, which are not subject to international humanitarian law”).
23. INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION
OF 12 AUGUST 1949, VOLUME III: G ENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS OF WAR 32 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans., 1960).
24. Id. at 31.
25. Id. at 35-36.
26. Id. at 35-36, 43.
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The essentially tautological definition of NIACs ultimately embraced
by the Commentaries – “armed conflicts, with armed forces on either side
engaged in hostilities”27 – much later gained clarification during the
proceedings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the international court created by UN Security Council
Resolution in 1993 to conduct trials for war crimes arising out of the
conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo.28 Drawing on the Commentaries for
guidance, Prosecutor v. Tadić held that a NIAC exists when two factors are
present: (1) “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities”
and (2) “organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”29
In a brief analysis applying this standard, the Tadić court concluded that
the level of violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 1992 had been
sufficient. While noting the relevance of official intergovernmental
conduct acknowledging the hostilities—in that case, the UN Security
Council had acted during this period to maintain peace and security in the
region—the court’s opinion emphasized the dual findings of sufficiently
organized parties (rather than scattered, loosely allied individuals) and
hostilities of sufficient intensity and duration to distinguish “armed
conflict” from more ordinary forms of violence.30
While the Tadić standard today enjoys broad international acceptance
(a point to which the Essay returns below), Tadić hardly settled all
uncertainty about the moment at which terrorism or “sporadic acts of
violence” crosses the threshold to “protracted armed violence.”31 States
and scholars have continued to raise questions about the effect of Tadić’s
application in a variety of settings,32 not least of which has been whether it
might be understood to include NIACs that reach “beyond the territory of
one State.”33 The long-simmering uncertainty surrounding this question
came to a boil around U.S. claims that the definition of NIAC might
include global military operations against a shifting set of terrorist
organizations found in dozens of countries – operations that now inform
arguments by several scholars who advocate a wholesale abandonment of
27. Id. at 37 (emphasis in original).
28. S.C. Res. 827, pmbl. (May 25, 1993).
29. Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT 94-1-1, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
30. See Tadić, supra note 22 (and accompanying text).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 32, at 50 (Wilmshurst ed., 2012)
(noting that “[i]t is not always easy to determine when a situation of violence within a State is to be
classified as a non-international armed conflict”); Carina Bergal, The Mexican Drug War: The Case for a
Non-International Armed Conflict Classification, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1042 (2011) (debating how to
classify the drug-related violence in Mexico).
33. See 2016 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 467-70 (noting that “the text and drafting
history are somewhat ambiguous” on the applicability of Common Article 3 to cross-border conflicts
but that “[t]he object and purpose of common Article 3 supports its applicability” in such settings).
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the effort to attach legal significance to the difference between “armed
conflict” and any lesser form of sub-state violence.34
Perhaps most sweeping among recent statements of this view is Rosa
Brooks’, who contends that global technological, political, and legal
changes in the past 50 years have increasingly blurred the distinction
between “war” and “peace.”35 Unlike classic civil wars or even crossborder guerilla movements in which the identities of non-state parties were
manifest, Brooks argues that it is today difficult even to “define our
enemy” amidst “numerous other networks and movements, loosely knit,
nonhierarchical, geographically dispersed, and diverse in size, structure,
methods and aims.”36 While the violence such groups are able to effect
may not be sustained, technological developments have empowered such
groups and individuals with extraordinary potential destructive capacity.
For these reasons, “we can’t tell whether a particular situation counts” as
an armed conflict, and it is thus impossible meaningfully to assess when
killing is legal and when it is murder.37 Under the circumstances, continued
insistence on the application of international law based on the vitality of
such a distinction only undermines “our ability to place meaningful
constraints on violence and power.”38

B. Indeterminacy in Perspective
The indeterminacy critics may be faulted for a variety of reasons, some
not especially complex. While lamenting the lack of elaborated meaning of
non-international armed conflict, indeterminacy scholars commonly ignore
the increasingly substantial body of case law (well beyond Tadić)
elaborating on and applying the definition (and therefore giving it growing
content) in a range of settings.39 Neither do critics attempt any systematic
(or non-systematic) account of the growing body of state practice that
might add customary meaning to the “armed conflict” threshold over time.
34. Hakimi, supra note 10, at 1369 (criticizing the NIAC standard as “notoriously deficient”);
accord BROOKS, supra note 7, at 350-51 (arguing for decoupling the determination about whether
killing is justified from the legal classification of a state of affairs as an “armed conflict” or not).
35. BROOKS, supra note 7, at 24.
36. Id. at 278; See also, e.g., Hakimi, supra note 10; Samuel Isacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Targeted
Warfare: Individuating Enemy Responsibility, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1534 (2013).
37. BROOKS, supra note 7, at 22.
38. Id. at 24.
39. See TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW A PPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE
(Michael Schmitt ed., 2013). Brooks’ book, for instance, devotes a single paragraph summarizing the
current IHL understanding of the definition of armed conflict, engaging neither the negotiating
history of the Geneva Conventions, nor the Convention Commentaries, nor any post-Tadić case law.
See BROOKS, supra note 7, at 172. Likewise, apart from noting the absence of definition in the text of
the relevant treaties, and the dilemma of United States’ post-9/11 war, Isacharoff and Pildes rely
solely on Hakimi for the proposition the definition is indeterminate. See Isacharoff & Pildes, supra
note 36, at 1534.
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At the same time, critics neglect to note the deep consensus that may be
found with respect to the existence of dozens of (definitionally
undisputed) NIACs in recent decades.40 For while there are certainly
circumstances in which the application of the “armed conflict”
classification is uncertain, there are also a vast number of cases in which it
is not. And while there can be little doubt that the nature of conflict has
changed over time as a matter of fact, one might still question the extent
to which these changes actually render questions of party organization or
degree of violence less answerable as a matter of law. For instance, while
Brooks describes the American post-9/11 conflict as one against “an illdefined, amorphous, protean enemy, with no leaders authorized to speak
on its behalf, no set membership, and only the vaguest of goals,”41 in fact,
the U.S. government has over time identified a highly specific list of enemy
groups,42 groups that do have named leaders,43 and troublingly specific
goals.44
In this respect, contemporary indeterminacy claims suffer especially
from the near-exclusive focus on the legal uncertainty generated by U.S.
practice, and its novel conception of its hostilities against Al Qaeda and
associates as a NIAC of global scope. In formal terms alone, the practice
of the United States is indisputably important to the development of
customary international law. But drawing conclusions about the utility of a
legal standard from its application in one particularly hard case seems to
risk just the kind of mistake Justice Holmes warned of a century ago –
letting hard cases make bad law.45 The degree of legal uncertainty
generated by this particular practical understanding might well be different
if any other state or international legal authority had embraced the U.S.
notion of a fully borderless NIAC as an accurate application of law. But
40. See, e.g., Sylvain Vité, Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts
and Actual Situations, 91 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 69 (2009); Hans-Peter Gasser, Internationalized NonInternational Armed Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lebanon, 33 AM. U. L. REV 145
(1983).
41. BROOKS, supra note 7, at 279.
42. Office of the U.S. President, Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding the
United States Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations (Dec. 2016),
https://fas.org/man/eprint/frameworks.pdf.
43. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD & CARLA E. HUMUD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43612, THE ISLAMIC STATE AND U.S. POLICY (2017) (summarizing background on the Islamic
State organization, including goals, operations, and affiliates) [hereinafter CRS ISLAMIC STATE
REPORT]; CLAYTON THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43756, AL QAEDA AND U.S. POLICY:
MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA (2016) (discussing Al Qaeda leadership and affiliates) [hereinafter CRS
AL QAEDA REPORT].
44. See, e.g., CRS ISLAMIC STATE REPORT, supra note 43 (discussing goals of re-establishing a
Caliphate and protecting ‘true Muslim believers’ from threats posed by idolaters, apostates, and other
non-believers); CRS AL QAEDA REPORT, supra note 43 (describing the group’s focus on targeting
America and on avoiding conflict with local governments).
45. See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“Great cases like hard cases make bad law.”).
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despite 17 years of U.S. attempts to convince others that the definition of
NIAC might be understood to include a conflict of global scope against
terrorist groups, this construct has thus far proven unpersuasive to the
ICRC or to any other state in the world, including America’s closest allies
(several of whom are also globally engaged against terrorist groups).46
It is important to note that the position that NIACs might sometimes
spill over international borders is hardly unique to the United States. IHL
has repeatedly grappled with the question whether a NIAC could be
defined to exist across territorial borders, as conflicts among non-state
actors in the past have too often crossed into the territory of one or more
neighboring states (among many, for example, Rwanda).47 Indeed, states,
scholars, and the ICRC have embraced the view that IHL continues to
apply in NIACs spilling over into the adjacent state, if not into “nonadjacent, non-belligerent” states.48 As the ICRC explains:
[S]pill over of a NIAC into adjacent territory cannot have the
effect of absolving the parties of their IHL obligations simply
because an international border has been crossed. The ensuing
legal vacuum would deprive of protection both civilians possibly
affected by the fighting, as well as persons who fall into enemy
hands.49
Indeed, there is no dispositive authority establishing that a NIAC could not
extend beyond adjacent states, and reasonable arguments that no such
distinction between geographically proximate states and geographically

46. The United States characterized its conflict with ISIL in Syria and Iraq as part of the same
NIAC with Al Qaeda for purposes of ensuring the applicability of domestic legal authority to use
force. See Stephen W. Preston, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Remarks by the General Counsel of the
Department of Defense on the Legal Framework for the United States’ Use of Military Force Since
9/11 (Apr. 10, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/DOD-GC-ASILSpeech.Legal-Framework.10Apr15.pdf). But see Letter from Michael Grant, the Chargé D’affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Canada, to the United Nations, Addressed to the President of the
Security Council (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1700700-canadasletter-to-the-un-about-syria.html (noting that America’s allies have relied on an independent
invocation of collective self-defense (of Iraq) under Article 51 of the UN Charter to explain the
international legal justification for their intervention against ISIL in Iraq and Syria).
47. See S.C. Res. 955 Annex, art. 1 (Nov. 8, 1994) (extending the court’s jurisdiction to
violations of IHL committed in Rwanda and against Rwandan citizens “in the territory of
neighboring States”).
48. See Jelena Pejic, Extraterritorial Targeting by Means of Armed Drones: Some Legal Implications, INT’ L
REV. RED CROSS 14 (2015) (citing Michael N. Schmitt, Charting the Legal Geography of Non-International
Armed Conflict, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 11 (2014) (noting that “there is growing acceptance of the
proposition that IHL applies to ‘spillover’ conflicts in which government armed forces penetrate the
territory of a neighboring State in order to engage organized armed groups operating in border
areas…”)); NILS MELZER, TARGETED K ILLINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 59-60 (2008) (discussing
state practice to this effect).
49. INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE
CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS 9-10 (2011).
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distant states could be logically sustained in light of the humanitarian
purpose of Common Article 3.50
Yet even these arguments fail to demonstrate as much indeterminacy
as critics imagine – for several reasons. For one, the interpretive move at
the core of purposive arguments for accepting a geographically-unlimited
application of the NIAC classification – that IHL should be construed to
apply as broadly as possible so that individuals do not fall into a “legal
vacuum” without protection51 – has been substantially weakened by the
existence of IHRL. If the application of NIAC would, in some particular
factual circumstance, have the effect of weakening the humanitarian
protections to which individuals are otherwise entitled under IHRL, then
surely the purpose of Common Article 3 would be better served by a
narrower construction of what counts as a NIAC. More important, the
argument that the definition of NIAC should be read as without geographic
limitation is far different from an argument that the law must be read this
way – a claim belied by the reality that the U.S. position on the existence
of a global NIAC has remained a singular minority view. Above all, it is a
far cry from the notion that one state believes the law should be extended
to apply to one indisputably novel situation, to the notion that modern
conflicts have created such uncertainty in the law as to render the standard
it establishes fundamentally unworkable as a whole.
This last point in particular helps to illuminate the nature of the
indeterminacy critique at its core – a critique that in key respects recalls
classic domestic jurisprudential debates over the relative merits of rules
and standards. Brooks and other indeterminacy critics (understandably)
long for a brighter line distinguishing those circumstances in which firstorder killing is lawful, and those in which it is not – that is, a clear and
specific rule that instructs “a decision-maker to respond in a determinate
way to the presence of delimited triggering facts.”52 While the “armed
conflict” threshold sounds like such a rule (and indeed, in conventional
terms draws a very bright line between kinds of killing allowed), the Tadić
test functions far more like a standard – a legal directive requiring
application of a “background principle or policy” of humanitarian
protection “to a fact situation.”53 Tadić’s totality-of-the-circumstances-type
test, turning on factors indicating the relative organization of the parties
and the intensity of the violence between them, offers the same advantage
50. See Noam Lubell, The War(?) Against Al-Qaeda, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 421, 434–37 (2012).
51. See OSCAR UHLER AND HENRI COURSIER, COMMENTARY IV: GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS 51 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) (“[N]obody in
enemy hands can be outside the law.”).
52. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992); cf. BROOKS, supra note 7; Hakimi, supra note 10.
53. Sullivan, supra note 52, at 58.
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as a standard: flexibility in the face of an infinite variety of competing
equities and factual possibilities. The test equally carries the main
disadvantage of a standard: difficulty in predicting how to conform one’s
conduct to the law in varied situations.
It is here the indeterminacy critic relies most directly on the classic
view of international law – maintaining that the standard-esque effect of
the “armed conflict” classification poses problems far more existential in
this setting than do standards elsewhere in law, both because the stakes of
the outcome are so very high,54 and because, “[i]n the international context
. . ., there is no [judicial or legislative] referee able to make such vital calls”
about how to apply core principles to a particular factual setting.55
Yet far from supporting this classic international law critique, the
“armed conflict” example proves useful in illustrating its contemporary
weakness. For one thing, neither of these factors (neither high stakes nor
the absence of conclusive adjudication) renders this context categorically
different from the domestic law settings in which these familiar
jurisprudential debates regularly arise. Domestic law has of course long
grappled with how to design standards applicable to situations with equal
consequences for life or death.56 And while it may seem ideal that a
determination as weighty as the legality of killing turn on a far brighter rule
than the “armed conflict” classification allows, it has been precisely
because these determinations are so weighty that domestic law has
preferred the standard-esque approach to promote humanitarian goals –
drawing on interpretive clues beyond the words of the standard themselves
to give meaning to what process is due,57 or what treatment is “humiliating
and degrading.”58 Indeterminacy critics themselves appear to recognize the
virtues of standards in this respect; to the extent they propose a substitute
test for determining when first-order killing is permitted, proposed
alternatives tend to look to the relative “proportionality” of the killing to
the perceived threat, or the “feasibility” of alternatives to killing.59 Yet it
goes unexplained why these similarly broad (or even broader) standards
will not also, like “armed conflict,” suffer the same indeterminate fate.
54. BROOKS, supra note 7, at 274-75.
55. Id. at 289 (highlighting in particular U.S. veto power over decisions of the UN Security
Council).
56. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 (2008) (holding that a method of execution violates
constitutional prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” only if it presents a “substantial
risk of serious harm” or an “objectively intolerable risk of harm”) (internal citations omitted); County
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849, 854, n.13 (1998) (suggesting that state conduct
deliberately intended to injure in a way unjustifiable by any government interest “shocks the
conscience” and violates the Due Process Clause, but holding that negligently causing death does not
meet this standard) (internal citations omitted).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
58. Geneva III, supra note 3.
59. Hakimi, supra note 10, at 1391-94; BROOKS, supra note 7, at 354 (advocating unspecified
better mechanisms to prevent “arbitrariness, mistake, and abuse in targeted killings”).
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What, then, of the absence of a judicial “referee,” the singular court of
compulsory jurisdiction necessary to provide authoritative settlement of
disputed meaning? While it is certainly possible that various aspects of
international law still suffer from the absence of settlement, the particular
question of what counts as a NIAC in IHL has been the subject of
extensive international judicial attention – and remarkable
interjurisdictional penetration. The ICTY’s Tadić test defining what counts
as a NIAC has been embraced by, among others, the International
Criminal Court, the European Court of Justice, and the U.S. federal
courts;60 Tadić is likewise recognized by the ICRC as the controlling test,
and Tadić is cited by multiple states in official defense department law of
war manuals (including the United States’) as the relevant principle of
law.61 One might see some greater issue if different jurisdictions had come
to different conclusions applying the Tadić test to the particular facts of the
U.S. conflict here, but there is as yet no jurisdiction that has embraced the
U.S. executive branch interpretation of the nature of its conflict with Al
Qaeda; further, the one jurisdiction indisputably controlling U.S. state
behavior – the U.S. Supreme Court – stopped notably short of embracing
the executive branch view that the U.S. NIAC extended beyond the
conflict in Afghanistan.62 Even if one embraced the classic critique that
international law lacks the systemic features required to promote legal
certainty, one would be hard pressed to deny the remarkable degree of
settlement here.
Indeed, even acknowledging the absence, at least in the most general
terms, of a singular, authoritative global executive or judicial decisionmaker for all IHL purposes, the interjurisdictional acceptance of Tadić
demonstrates how a distributed network of legal decision-makers, each
60. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Case No. T-04-84-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 19, 2010) (offering a detailed list of criteria to determine intensity,
including metrics of death, damage, and social upheaval); Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, art 8(2)(d)-(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 97-98 (following Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, U.N. Doc A/32/144, Appendix II (1977)
16 International Legal Materials 144); Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06,
judgment, (Mar. 14, 2012); Case C-285/12, Aboubacar Diakité v. Commissaire général aux réfugiés et
aux apatrides, 2014 E.C.R. l-921; United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1278, n.54 (Ct. Mil.
Comm’n Rev. 2011) (en banc), rev’d, Hamdan II, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled on other
grounds, Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2014); 2016 ICRC COMMENTARY,
supra note 5.
61. See DANIEL HESSEL ET AL., BELOW THE THRESHOLD: THE LAW GOVERNING THE USE
OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE ABSENCE OF A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT, 3-5 (2015) (citing military manuals of the United States, United Kingdom, France and
Germany).
62. While Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), is often cited for the proposition that the
U.S. Supreme Court recognizes a transnational NIAC between the United States and Al Qaeda, the
Hamdan Court was careful to limit its holding to the conflict between those parties then occurring “in
the territory” of Afghanistan. Id. at 556.
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authoritative in its own jurisdiction, may have the same effect. This is
exactly as in U.S. domestic law, where countless constitutional decisions
reached in lower federal and state courts, and in the work of legislatures
and executives at the federal and state levels, as legal decision-makers must
draft, apply, and enforce legal rules every day under circumstances no
singular court will ever review.63 It may not be an ideal legal system in
some abstract sense, but it equally cannot distinguish the NIAC standard
of IHL, or indeed many parts of international law, from an ordinary
domestic legal system in this respect.
A final point. None of the foregoing is intended as an argument
against the prospect that some substantive value or values might be better
advanced by identifying factors other than party organization and ambient
violence on which to ground the determination whether first-order killing
is lawful – that is, that a “feasibility” test or some other analytical approach
might better reflect current moral, political, or strategic sensibilities about
the nature and propriety of the use of lethal force. The Essay returns to
this possibility below. Here, the suggestion is only that imperfect clarity
alone does not distinguish the “armed conflict” classification from any
other legal standard. Abandoning it thus seems unlikely to justify the
transition costs associated with shifting from one legal standard to another.

III. THE ACCOUNTABILITY CRITIQUE
If the primary import of the “armed conflict” indeterminacy critique is
to surface long-festering debates about the adequacy of the international
legal system to resolve the common problem of legal uncertainty, a second
group of critiques turns, ironically, on a contrary complaint: that the NIAC
standard is both too rigid and counterproductively set in the wrong place.
Scholars here, whom I call “accountability critics,” contend that requiring
some exceptional degree of violence before hostilities rise to the level of a
NIAC creates law avoidance incentives that may compromise
opportunities for criminal justice for violators, or otherwise compromise
compliance with the humanitarian goals both IHL and IHRL were
designed to achieve. As this Part explains, the accountability critique
suffers from a variety of deficits on its own terms. Further, reflecting
longstanding concerns that the international legal system lacks sufficient
mechanisms for constraining the behavior of non-compliant states, the
accountability critique here discounts the prospects for formal
enforcement in the contemporary international system’s distributed
mechanisms for criminal justice and fails to take account of what
63. See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law,
Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791 (2009).
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international law theorists over the post-War era gradually came to realize:
formal enforcement remains, in international law as in domestic, of only
partial significance in securing compliance with law.

A. Understanding the Debate
Far from focusing narrowly on the unique circumstances of the
conflict between the United States and various terrorist groups,
accountability critics are more concerned about those parts of the world
where vulnerable populations still grapple with underdeveloped or
undeveloped domestic or international law protecting ordinary peacetime
human rights. For while the development of domestic constitutions
protecting rights, and of IHRL writ large, might change the way large parts
of the world think about the importance of IHL as a safeguard against
humanitarian transgressions in war, the argument goes, gaps in legal
protection that remain in other parts of the world may make it far more
important to the protection of individual rights that IHL’s baseline
humanitarian safeguards be triggered sooner rather than later.64 Indeed,
now that an International Criminal Court finally holds out at least the
prospect of formal accountability for war crimes, hesitation or refusal to
recognize the existence of an armed conflict in its early days may
effectively immunize acts of violence that during any other period of the
conflict would be manifestly prosecutable.65 War crimes only exist, after
all, when an “armed conflict” exists.66 Overly-demanding standards for the
level of violence required to trigger war – especially where states are not
otherwise inclined to comply with basic human rights – risks leaving
individuals without either front-end legal protection, or back-end justice.
Maximizing the prospect that law will secure state compliance with
humanitarian protections thus depends on broadening the set of
circumstances in which law recognizes the existence of war.
One version of this argument is offered by Laurie Blank and Geoff
Corn, who focus on the incentives the current “armed conflict” threshold
gives states disinclined to attend to individual rights in the ordinary course.
Writing in the wake of the apparent reluctance of various international
experts to acknowledge that the violence in Syria had risen to the level of
armed conflict, Blank and Corn urge that the Tadić test be construed more
flexibly, such that a relatively lower degree of violence might still suffice to
64. See, e.g., Laurie R. Blank & Geoffrey S. Corn, Losing the Forest for the Trees: Syria, Law and the
Pragmatics of Conflict Recognition, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 693, 740-43 (2013).
65. See Adil Ahmad Haque, Triggers and Thresholds of Non-International Armed Conflict, JUST
SECURITY.ORG (Sep. 29, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/33222/triggers-thresholds-noninternational-armed-conflict/.
66. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 60.
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establish an armed conflict if one could point to a relatively higher degree
of party organization – and vice versa.67 As they contend, demanding that
both elements of the Tadić test invariably be met before recognizing that
the protections of Common Article 3 attach risks creating incentives for
state armed forces that undermine IHL’s goal of protecting all sides “from
unnecessary suffering and gratuitous violence”:68
“[W]hat history seems to demonstrate repeatedly is that states
almost always tend to err on the side of aggressiveness when they
feel threatened by dissident movements. This is unsurprising. A
state seeking to preserve its warrant will almost always perceive
even a nascent and poorly organized armed opposition movement
as a critical national security challenge.…[I]t is often precisely at
this point in the threat evolution that a massive and heavy-handed
combat response will be perceived as decisive…Government
forces will seek to exploit the nascent organization of opposition
or dissident movements with the application of overwhelming
force, creating a situation wholly unsuited for normal peacetime
legal regulation. In this context, issues such as lawful objects of
attack, precautions in the attack, minimization of collateral
damage, clear standards of protection for those rendered hors de
combat, protection for the wounded and sick, establishment of
neutral zones, and access to humanitarian relief become essential.
…[R]efusing to recognize the existence of armed conflict
eviscerates the efficacy of these norms by rendering them
inapplicable.”69
On this view, most apparently in places where rights may be inadequately
protected under other bodies of law (where, for example, domestic or
international human rights laws are underdeveloped or unobserved),
having available such basic constraining legal guidance would seem critical
to the achievement of any humanitarian goals.
Indeed, concerns that states regularly maneuver to avoid or deny the
application of IHL in certain settings – formally rejecting the existence of
an otherwise manifest international or non-international armed conflict to
avoid the application of IHL rules – was central in motivating the shift
from subjective to objective measures for establishing the existence of an
armed conflict in modern IHL.70 One of the great innovations of the
67. Blank & Corn, supra note 64, at 742-43 (noting that “[s]ome hostilities must be necessary for
a situation to qualify as an armed conflict—inherent in the term armed—although it does seem
logical to reduce the intensity threshold when the evidence of organization is overwhelming”).
68. Id. at 731.
69. Id. at 738-40.
70. Id. at 711 (“Just as Common Article 2’s paradigm for international armed conflict eliminates
the opportunity for states to engage in law avoidance by creating an objective trigger untethered to
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modern Geneva Conventions was thus to ensure that the failure of a state
to declare war could no longer absolve the state of the obligation to
comply with IHL in the midst of hostilities that were, declaration or not,
apparent for all the world to see. Concerns of law avoidance have been
equally central to the ICRC’s more recent position advocating a relatively
high threshold for establishing the end of a NIAC; according to the ICRC,
parties should be bound to comply with IHL standards as long as possible
lest the end of conflict produce a situation in which it may be possible to
argue that no law applies.71 Particularly for conflicts involving states with
poor peacetime human rights records, one can understand the case that
humanitarian interests may be better served by the imposition of at least
the modest constraints of Common Article 3 than by no law recognized as
effectively binding at all.
Citing both humanitarian concerns and criminal accountability
interests especially, Adil Haque argues more broadly in favor of a “nominal
threshold for both IAC and NIAC.”72 Also troubled by the Syrian
example, Haque offers the scenario in which a non-state group like ISIL
invades Iraq, killing only a handful of Iraqi civilians and taking over Iraqi
government institutions, while local forces flee, offering no resistance.
Suggesting that current Tadić rules might not require the recognition of an
armed conflict at the outset of such an operation (given the nonopposition and a relatively low level of actual violence), Haque worries that
Tadić risks leaving ISIL’s early acts of violence untouchable by
international criminal law (whose jurisdiction is triggered only in
circumstances of “armed conflict”). He worries equally that any hesitation
in conflict classification frees third party states from otherwise putatively
applicable obligations to try or extradite those who have committed crimes
of war.73

B. Accountability in Perspective
Setting aside for the moment whether these authors are right in
assuming that a proper application of Tadić would fail to recognize the
existence of a NIAC in these settings,74 it should be apparent how a call to
declarations of war or other public pronouncements, so Common Article 3 also introduced the same
objective approach to internal armed conflict…”).
71. See 2016 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 5.
72. See Haque, supra note 65.
73. Id.
74. The Tadić decision and its progeny all insist on looking to an array of factors to help assess
both intensity and organization, and have expressly resisted claims that the presence or absence of
any one criterion is dispositive. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶¶
49, 60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) (“Trial Chambers have relied on
indicative factors relevant for assessing the ‘intensity’ criterion, none of which are, in themselves,
essential to establish that the criterion is satisfied. These indicative factors include the number,
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lower the level of violence required before an armed conflict may be said
to exist – requiring, for instance, only “nominal” levels of violence –
would be tantamount in practical terms to abandoning “armed conflict” as
a meaningful trigger altogether. All societies have some nominal level of
violence all the time; the law of exception – the killing rules of exception –
would become the rule. The argument that humanitarian and related
interests would be better served by lowering the armed conflict threshold
in this sense seems a difficult case.
The strength of the argument thus turns on what might be gained by
lowering the NIAC threshold – gains critics list as (1) improving the
prospect of criminal accountability, and (2) increasing the likelihood that
states will comply with basic humanitarian protections like avoiding
collateral harm to civilians and ensuring humane treatment for detainees.75
But those gains seem, even on their face, unlikely to be quite as significant
as accountability critics suggest. Consider, for instance, the promise of
greater criminal accountability for the crimes committed beginning early in
the course of conflict settings like that of ISIL’s emergence in Syria and
Iraq – in important part because the existence of an armed conflict will
make third party states more likely to feel legally obligated to prosecute-orextradite ISIL fighters.76 Doctrinally, there is at best a hope that states will
feel so compelled, for where, as in the invasion by ISIL of Iraq, the
conflict is non-international, the legal obligation to do is far less clear.77
Likewise, it is far from evident that earlier application of IHL
protections might, overall, produce better humanitarian outcomes than
allowing ambient, non-conflict law to prevail. For assessing any benefits
here can only be fairly done in full view of the humanitarian cost IHL’s
application also brings. And as the ICRC has recognized, because IHL
“rules on what constitutes the lawful taking of life or on detention in
duration and intensity of individual confrontations; the type of weapons and other military
equipment used; the number and calibre of munitions fired; the number of persons and type of
forces partaking in the fighting; the number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; and the
number of civilians fleeing combat zones. The involvement of the UN Security Council may also be a
reflection of the intensity of a conflict.”). Even where armed violence is entirely one-sided – for
instance, where a state launches a sustained bombardment over a period of weeks against an
organized armed group in which the state destroys entire tracts of property and drives thousands of
civilians from their homes, but in which the non-state group is too overmatched to fight back – it
seems hard to imagine the Tadić court would dispute characterizing these events as a NIAC.
75. See, e.g., Haque, supra note 65.
76. See U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria: ISIS Is
Committing
Genocide
Against
the
Yazidis
(June
16,
2016)
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20113#sthash.Wwvsev
ZM.dpuf.
77. While the ICRC maintains that customary international law obligates states at a minimum to
investigate and prosecute war crimes allegedly committed in NIACs, even it notes that a number of
states have issued amnesties for war crimes). See Int’l Committee of the Red Cross, Customary IHL
Database, Rule 158. Prosecution of War Crimes, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule158#Fn_65_13.
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international armed conflict … allow for more flexibility than the rules
applicable in non-armed conflicts governed by other bodies of law,” it is
“dangerous and unnecessary … to apply” IHL to circumstances not
amounting to armed conflict.78 To be clear, this is not an argument that
IHL is in any sense an affirmative grant of power. Rather, it is merely to
acknowledge that it is not possible in many circumstances to reconcile the
basic IHRL prohibition on arbitrary killing with the basic IHL permission
to kill on the basis of status as a first resort.79 It may well be that a given
military in a given conflict concludes that it is categorically inconsistent
with military necessity to kill when capture is possible.80 But this judgment
is not compelled by the law of armed conflict. It is only compelled by the
law of human rights. The lower the threshold for recognizing a NIAC, the
fewer the circumstances in which that compulsion applies. State arguments
that a NIAC exists in the presence of only a nominal degree of violence
(or indeed, in the presence of an ongoing threat of violence) thus risk
becoming the latest state form of law avoidance – a means of avoiding the
application of greater rather than lesser humanitarian protections, a means
that has only become generally available since the emergence of
international human rights. Pressure to expand the definition of armed
conflict in this respect risks collapsing the distinction between the human
rights law rule and the law of war exception altogether, effectively
shrinking the time and space in which ordinary IHRL right-to-life rules –
even if only in customary form – may be said to govern state behavior.
Here it is necessary to pause to address a key response to this concern,
namely, the United States’ longstanding refusal to recognize the
extraterritorial application either of its own Constitution or the ICCPR.81
That is, even if IHRL is more protective than IHL in the abstract, it would
make no practical difference (or worse, a counterproductive difference) in
the concrete, most pressing application of those rules – the United States’
use of lethal targeting in global counterterrorism operations.82 Insisting
that the United States’ engagement with Al Qaeda and its associates is not
78. INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE
CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICT 8 (2007).
79. See McCann v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97, ¶¶ 146-54 (1995).
80. See Presidential Policy Guidance, Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist
Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities (May 22, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/procedures_for_approving_direct_action_against_
terrorist_targets/download.
81. The U.S. Supreme Court has not generally recognized the application of, for instance,
Fourth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution to foreign nationals outside the territorial
United States. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). The United States
likewise maintains that the ICCPR does not limit its actions outside territory under its jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Charlie Savage, U.S., Rebuffing U.N., Maintains Stance That Rights Treaty Does Not Apply Abroad,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2014, at A12.
82. See generally Yahli Shereshevsky, Politics by Other Means: The Battle over the Classification of
Asymmetrical Conflicts, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 455 (2016).
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an “armed conflict” will only diminish rather than strengthen the
humanitarian protections that apply as a matter of law to U.S. operations.
As long as the United States thinks it is fighting a NIAC, at least it will
recognize the application of Common Article 3. If the United States thinks
that its current conflict with Al Qaeda is not a NIAC, however, it will not
recognize the applicability of other human rights rules outside the United
States – effectively diminishing available rights protection.
This argument is problematic in several respects. First, as with efforts
to draw conclusions about the general clarity of the “armed conflict”
standard from the peculiar example of the U.S. application, the argument
here risks allowing the hard case to make bad law. Because a majority of
countries do recognize the extraterritorial application of IHRL,83 it seems
perverse to use the singular U.S. example to justify a worldwide expansion
of the scope of IHL application. Second, this argument misunderstands
the way in which the United States has come to use a lowered threshold
for NIAC as its own form of law avoidance. The universal rejection of the
view that the United States is engaged in a transnational NIAC with Al
Qaeda and associated forces has done nothing to diminish the United
States’ stated intent to comply in its conflict with at least Common Article
3, rules the United States today considers itself bound to as a matter of
customary international law under any circumstances.84 On the other hand,
the United States’ insistence that its hostilities are part of a NIAC has been
essential in persuading U.S. courts that domestic sources of legal authority
should be read to permit the use of wartime measures.85 In other words,
the United States uses its unique definition of NIAC not so much to avoid
the application of IHRL (which it denies anyway), or Common Article 3
(which it applies anyway), but rather to lend legal legitimacy to its claim
that first-resort lethal targeting is authorized under its domestic law.
83. See generally Oona Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human Rights Treaty
Obligations Apply Extraterritorially?, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 389 (2011) (reviewing jurisprudence of the
supreme courts of Canada and Britain, as well as the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”),
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACHR”), and International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), and
finding that all but one has embraced the view that human rights obligations apply extraterritorially
when the acting government exercises “effective control” over the territory, person, or situation in
question).
84. See U.S. Dep’t of Def., Law of War Manual § 3.1.1.2 (June 2015),
www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/DoD_Law_of_War_ManualJune_2015_Updated_May_2016.pdf (“DoD practice also has been to adhere to certain standards in
the law of war, even in situations that do not constitute ‘war’ or ‘armed conflict,’ because these law of
war rules reflect standards that must be adhered to in all circumstances.”); see also § 2.5 (Distinction);
§ 5.5 (Discrimination in Conducting Attacks).
85. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[W]e understand Congress’
grant of authority for the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force’ to include the authority to detain
for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war
principles. If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts
that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel.”).
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If one sets aside the special case of the United States, it becomes
apparent that the accountability critique is most occupied by a species of
the same problem that has animated international law realists since World
War II: the concern that international law, especially lacking in formal
enforcement mechanisms, cannot function effectively to constrain the
behavior of sovereign states not otherwise inclined to behavioral
constraint.86 This accountability concern is certainly evident in calls to
expand the definition of “armed conflict” in the hope of maximizing
chances for justice before an international criminal court, an interest that
has long driven development in the field.87 Yet modern practice has
increasingly demonstrated that international war crimes prosecution is
hardly the only criminal alternative. In the case of ISIL in particular, there
already exist a fair number of states that may plausibly assert ordinary
prescriptive jurisdiction over one or more ISIL members, arrested
domestically or outside a domestic jurisdiction, for violating a range of
domestic criminal laws.88 More, even if no functional domestic
government can properly assert conventional prescriptive jurisdiction over
particular NIAC-related offenses, it is today apparent that universal
jurisdiction practice has also been “quietly but persistently expanding”
across a range of offenses since the early 1990s.89 Indeed, according to a
new study by Maximo Langer and Mackenzie Eason, the past decade has
seen “more completed universal jurisdiction trials than in the previous
twenty years combined; and there have been substantially more completed
universal jurisdiction trials than completed trials at the International
Criminal Court.”90 Given this existing state of affairs, if and when criminal
prosecution becomes possible (overcoming a host of practical hurdles), it
is far from apparent how adding a handful of additional potential offenses

86. See generally HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS A MONG NATIONS: T HE STRUGGLE FOR
POWER AND PEACE (1948) (noting that in the decentralized international system, in the relatively
rare instances when law is violated, the availability of sanctions could depend solely on the
“vicissitudes of the distribution of power between the violator of the law and the victim of the
violation”).
87. As one of the judgments of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg famously
opined, violations of “international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who [violate such laws] can the provisions of international law be enforced.”
Judicial Decisions: International Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, Oct. 1, 1946, 41 AM. J. INT’L
L. 172, 221 (1947).
88. See THE AMERICAN EXCEPTION: TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES:
THE ISIS CASES MARCH 2014–AUGUST 2017 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2017) (reporting criminal
charges against 135 ISIS defendants in U.S. federal courts); Steven Morris, British Woman who Joined
ISIS in Syria Guilty of Encouraging Terror Acts, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jan/29/british-woman-tareena-shakil-joined-isissyria-guilty-encouraging-terror (describing the UK criminal prosecution of an ISIL member).
89. See generally Máximo Langer and Mackenzie Eason, The Quiet Expansion of Universal
Jurisdiction (UCLA Sch. of Law Working Paper, 2017) (on file with author).
90. Id. at 3.
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to the list of manifest criminal wrongs ISIL has already committed serves
much of a practical accountability benefit.
As important, just as post-War practice has helped demonstrate that
individual criminal accountability for international offenses may be
achieved through distributed mechanisms beyond a single, central court of
compulsory criminal jurisdiction, so too has the vast scholarly response to
the post-War realists demonstrated that formal enforcement is only part of
a set of reasons why states – or individuals – might comply with law or
not. As theorists today recognize, states have a range of interests that
motivate behavior toward or away from compliance with a legal rule,
including, for example, interests in reciprocal treatment and reputation.91
Here, accountability critics’ intuition seems to be that the earlier,
formal applicability of IHL in this setting would make it more difficult for
putatively repressive states to avoid the application of any rights-protective
law in a domestic conflict.92 Thus, the argument might go, states are more
likely to attend to, for example, the IHL rule to minimize civilian casualties
(proportionality) than to parallel strictures in the ICCPR, customary
international law, or domestic constitutional regimes (all roughly
prohibiting arbitrariness or deliberate indifference in taking life). To flesh
out a rationale for this view, one might hypothesize that otherwise-nonhuman-rights-protective states (presumptively lacking effective domestic
law rights protections) are more apt to comply with the IHL treaty regime
(to which all states are party) than to the IHRL treaty regime (which boasts
broad, but not universal, adherence), or to customary law. While one
might naively imagine that a state with an established record of disinterest
in the legal protection of human rights in times of relative calm seems
unlikely to develop such an interest on the threshold of internal armed
conflict, it is true that 19 states (including Myanmar, Singapore, and Saudi
Arabia) have obligated themselves by treaty not to engage in
disproportionate targeting in “armed conflict,”93 but have undertaken no
such formal treaty obligation to protect the right to life under the ICCPR
otherwise – suggesting that states themselves may perceive some
difference in the value or relevance of the obligations.94 Even if one sets
aside the reality that the states most commonly the subject of discussion in
the “armed conflict” debate today all have ratified the ICCPR (including
91. For a useful summary of key post-war insights, see BETH A. SIMMONS , MOBILIZING FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS: INT’L LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 116-18, 121-25 (2009).
92. See Blank & Corn, supra note 64, at 695-96.
93. INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, States Parties to the Convention (III) relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?
xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=375.
94. None of these states is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). See U.N. U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Status of Ratification
Interactive Dashboard (2014), http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
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Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria),95 it is still possible to hypothesize that
behavioral incentives of one kind or another make those states more likely
to adhere to their IHL obligations than to any apparent under the ICCPR.
But while post-War international law scholars have certainly
recognized the importance of behavioral incentives – all apart from formal
enforcement – in motivating state compliance with law, neither the
theoretical literature nor the increasingly rich empirical literature that has
blossomed since World War II offers much cause to expect that states will
comply with Rule A contained in one treaty regime to which they are
party, but not comply with substantively the same Rule A contained in a
different treaty regime to which they are also party. Thus, for example,
scholars have recognized that states engaged in interstate armed conflict are
likely concerned with reciprocity, reputation, and the like in their own
conduct of hostilities in that conflict.96 But it is less clear why reciprocity
concerns would motivate any state engaged in a purely internal armed
conflict, for there are no other treaty-obligated warring states on the other
side. Likewise, to the extent a NIAC-involved state is worried about the
reputational or strategic effects of non-compliance with a particular rule,
the impact on reputation seems likely to be the same whether the state is
complying (or failing to comply) with IHL proportionality obligations, or
IHRL proportionality-equivalent obligations. If a state is killing large
numbers of civilians, in violation of any law, the effect on its reputation
among states is unlikely to be good.
Scholars are entirely right to be concerned about how to maximize the
likelihood that states engaged in NIACs will behave humanely toward
rights-bearing populations. But while insights into why states behave as
they do have grown tremendously in the past half-century, there is nothing
thus far to suggest that shifting the moment at which humanitarian legal
protections are governed by one regime or another is likely to make a
difference.

IV. THE POLICY CRITIQUE
In explaining why international law could not yet be considered part of
a mature legal system, Hart highlighted its lack of what he called secondary
rules – “power-conferring” laws and processes by which primary rules of
conduct (no targeting of civilians, for instance) could be authoritatively

95. U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Status of Ratification Interactive
Dashboard (2014), http://indicators.ohchr.org/.
96. See James D. Morrow, When Do States Follow the Laws of War?, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 559
(2007).
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identified, applied, and changed.97 Hart understood that because all
primary rules in law by their nature carry certain defects – not only
uncertainty in meaning and “the fact of violation,” but also the eventuality
of obsolescence – mature legal systems necessarily had methods by which
they could regularly and predictably engage in the process of legal change.
Especially given the international legal system’s lack of a singular
legislature,98 and the Cold War dysfunction of what formal institutions it
had (like those established by the UN Charter), international law in this
view remained frustratingly unable to address inevitable changes in global
conditions.99
International legal instruments, institutions and other mechanisms for
advancing legal change have developed significantly since 1961, but as this
part explores, frustration surrounding international law’s perceived failure
to keep pace with change echoes in contemporary debates about the utility
of the category “armed conflict.”100 This part begins by introducing the
policy arguments driving recent calls for abandoning the “armed conflict”
classification, and first engages their claims on their own terms. Among
other problems, many of the policy failings perceived in current law are
either irrelevant to or confound the question whether it is necessary to
abandon the “armed conflict” threshold as a trigger of legal significance. It
then suggests that, to the extent IHL has failed to keep pace with
perceived needs, it is not a sign of inadequately-developed mechanisms for
legal change, but rather a phenomenon familiar in the most mature legal
systems: reflection of a substantive judgment that the case for particular
changes has not yet been made.

A. Understanding the Debate
The policy case against the armed conflict threshold is on its face the
most challenging of the categorical critiques, a concern championed by law
and security thinkers who argue that the cloak of “armed conflict” ill-suits
the contemporary body of violent hostilities in the world writ large. On
this view, the requirement that there be a certain intensity of violence
between organized parties before lethal targeting under NIAC rules is
permitted fails to account for the serious, chronic, and increasingly typical
threat posed by loosely organized or shifting groups or individuals, able to
97. HART, supra note 18, at 81, 92-94 (describing the need for rules of recognition, change, and
adjudication that determine what the primary legal rules are and when they have been violated).
98. HART, supra note 18, at 209.
99. Id. at 226-28.
100. See Hakimi, supra note 10, at 1367 (lamenting that “[i]nstead of embracing” agreement
about justifiable outcomes, “and trying to develop shared parameters for counterterrorism
operations,” debates among state and non-state advocates remain hamstrung by secondary disputes
over legal conflict classification).
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act beyond the reach of other existing legal authorities.101 Current conflict
conditions, or conditions that will soon prevail, are substantially
characterized not only by sustained violent campaigns by organized
groups, but also by far more loosely-affiliated groups and individuals who
are able to capitalize on technologies that put more and more intensely
destructive power in the hands of smaller and smaller numbers of
individuals.102 What Michael Adams calls “jus extra bellum,”103 David
Barno and Nora Bensahel call “gray zone conflicts,”104 and Rosa Brooks
calls the “space between” war and peace,105 is increasingly occupied by
proliferating drone and cyber technology, biotechnology, and more – all of
which can be readily weaponized by state and non-state actors alike to
inflict profound harm without any of the trappings of group organization,
geography, or even duration that have been thought central to our
understanding of the category of “armed conflict.”106 It would be a
complex set of challenges in the best of circumstances, but in the absence
of more “robust, responsible, and accountable forms of international
governance,”107 we have only the diffuse interpretive competition of one
state’s view against another on the question of what the rules permit,
leaving uncertain decision-makers and outmoded norms, rather than
effectively governing law.
Given such changes, policy critics maintain that requiring a state to ask
whether a particular threat can be thought of as part of an “armed
conflict” or not only obscures more meaningful debate about the
“substantive” reasons whether and when action against these kinds of
threats should be lawful.108 Might it not make more sense or at least clarify
matters, the policy critics ask, to have the legal availability of killing depend
on some other test? Brooks and Hakimi diverge on the significance of the
“armed conflict” classification under current law: Brooks views it as legally
pivotal and Hakimi notes contexts in which the legality analysis comes out
101. See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 7; Michael J. Adams, Jus Extra Bellum: Reconstructing the Ordinary,
Realistic Conditions of Peace, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 377 (2014).
102. See BROOKS, supra note 7, at 141; Adams, supra note 100; Hakimi, supra note 10, at 1374-75
(highlighting the chronic violence committed by groups like Al Qaeda and drug cartels, whose
“organizational structures, intentions, and levels of violence vary widely” and whose actions “fall
somewhere in between” those that rise to the level of armed conflict and not). In fairness, concerns
about weapons technologies and the (resulting) rising power of small groups of non-state actors have
been detailed in the security literature for years. See Christopher F. Chyba & Alex L. Greninger,
Biotechnology and Bioterrorism: An Unprecedented World 46 SURVIVAL 143 (2004).
103. Adams, supra note 101.
104. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, Fighting and Winning in the “Gray Zone,” WAR ON THE
ROCKS (May 19, 2015), https://warontherocks.com/2015/05/fighting-and-winning-in-the-grayzone/.
105. BROOKS, supra note 7, at 353.
106. See BROOKS, supra note 7, at 129-41; Adams, supra note 100, at 425.
107. BROOKS, supra note 7, at 253.
108. Hakimi, supra note 10, at 1385 (“[F]ocusing on the domain question undermines
substantive resolution.”).
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the same whether an “armed conflict” exists or not. But they separately
arrive at recommendations that are identically categorical in nature:
decouple the determination about whether killing is justified, from the
legal classification of a situation as an “armed conflict.”109

B. Policy in Perspective
While there can be little doubt of the existence of the increasingly
complex array of threats the policy critics describe, it is far from evident
that legal change – in particular, abandoning the armed conflict
classification as a legal rule of relevance – would address the policy
concerns critics perceive. Indeed, several scholars today contend that the
existence of an armed conflict or not is already practically irrelevant in an
IHRL world. Far from simply permitting first-resort killing, this view
holds, IHL’s combined principles of distinction, proportionality, necessity,
and humanity effectively require the very same kind of judgment IHRL
imposes to render the use of lethal force permissible: a context-specific,
fact-dependent determination of how much force is reasonable given the
totality of the circumstances.110 Such analyses have been bolstered by
recent ICRC guidance embracing a notably restrictive view of military
necessity,111 and by sometime U.S. policy guidance imposing limits beyond
those otherwise required by IHL on the use of lethal force against terrorist
targets outside of areas of active hostilities.112 The overlap in IHL/IHRL
outcomes is especially apparent in those contemporary circumstances in
which the use of lethal force has been most contested – in a setting where
the existence of a threat is apparent but the existence of an “armed
conflict” as such is unclear. Consider for example, a state’s discovery of a
lone, religious cult member on the way to depositing a biological pathogen
into a city water supply. Different states and different bodies of law might
109. See Hakimi, supra note 10.
110. See Adil Ahmad Haque, Triggers and Thresholds of Non-International Armed Conflict, JUST
SECURITY
(Sep.
29,
2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/33222/triggers-thresholds-noninternational-armed-conflict/; see also Monika Hakimi, Taking Stock of the Law on Targeting, EJIL: TALK!
(Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.ejiltalk.org/taking-stock-of-the-law-on-targeting-part-i/.
111. See INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION
OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES U NDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 79
(2015) (finding that the principles of military necessity and humanity “reduce the sum total of
permissible military action from that which IHL does not expressly prohibit to that which is actually
necessary for the accomplishment of a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing circumstances”);
INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE
CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS (2015) (offering a three-part test for when
to apply targeting norms and when to apply other rules in IACs and NIACs: firm control, no
hostilities in area, no foreseeable risk of reinforcements).
112. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE P RESIDENT, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY
FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED
NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 24-25 (2016).
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dress the legal inquiry in different doctrinal clothing – involving tests
about the imminence of the threat, the availability of alternatives, the
amount of force reasonably necessary under the circumstances – but in the
end neither domestic nor international law would deny a state recourse in
such a situation to take some action, up to and potentially including lethal
force, to prevent such an attack. To the extent conclusions about the
legality of killing differ in this in sort of setting, the argument goes, it is a
result of the difference in what is assessed to be reasonable under different
circumstances, not a result of a difference in the nature of the legal analysis
required.
Yet while it is evident that certain rights protections in IHL and IHRL
overlap,113 and that there are some circumstances in which outcomes
under IHL and IHRL are the same, it is far more difficult – indeed,
impossible – to make the claim that there are comparably similar
requirements in both regimes for considering all reasonable alternatives in
primary targeting. Notwithstanding scholarly suggestions that IHL should be
read to include some duty to capture rather than kill otherwise lawful
targets in armed conflict wherever possible,114 neither the United States
nor any state party to the Geneva Conventions recognizes that position as
law.115 Rather, it is the reality that IHL permits first-resort targeting of
lawful targets without reference to alternative options (even in
circumstances in which those targets pose no active or meaningful threat),
that has led some to call for reconsidering the rules of IHL to bring them
more in line with modern moral intuitions.116
The most that can then be said is that while IHL and IHRL may, on
some occasions, produce the same outcome on the question of legality,
there are other occasions in which they will not. And traditional battlefield
circumstances are not the only occasion on which this will be the case.
Imagine a modified version of the bioterrorist scenario above. Rather than
involving an individual actor en route to delivering a pathogen into a water
supply, suppose the actor is a former state biological weapons scientist en
route to a meeting with a newly emerging terrorist organization to which
he has pledged his allegiance. If the terrorist organization is part of an
113. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
114. See Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 816
(2013) (arguing that the modern law of armed conflict should be understood to require that, in
certain circumstances, “if enemy combatants can be put out of action by capturing them, they should
not be injured; if they can be put out of action by injury, they should not be killed”).
115. See INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF
DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 80 (2009)
(concluding that “[i]n classic large-scale confrontations between well-equipped and organized armed
forces or groups, the principles of military necessity and of humanity are unlikely to restrict the use of
force against legitimate military targets beyond what is already required by the specific provisions of
IHL”).
116. See Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 115 (2010).
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existing armed conflict, IHL may permit lethal targeting of such an actor.
But in the absence of an existing armed conflict, human rights law will not
justify his killing, and certainly not on the basis of group status alone.
Policy critics are thus right to recognize the ongoing significance of the
“armed conflict” trigger in some swath of circumstances. Yet the policy
critics’ initial line of attack – that the armed conflict standard obscures a
more meaningful inquiry into the “substantive” reasons whether particular
action should be justified – does not follow.117 For it is hardly the case that
the armed conflict classification lacks substantive content. Quite the
contrary. The armed conflict inquiry reflects the deeply substantive
judgment that there is a specific and unique set of conditions, the existence
of which suffices to justify first-resort killing that is otherwise unjustifiable.
In NIACs, these are conditions in which the groups fighting one another
are organized enough to be capable of observing certain baseline rules
governing the way they fight,118 but in which the intensity of fighting is
great enough that more detailed inquiries into individual culpability and
absolute necessity are either impossible or unreasonable.119 Asking
whether a set of circumstances amounts in legal terms to a NIAC is, in this
sense, no different from asking whether this particular set of substantive
justifications for killing exists. If the terrorist organization in our biological
weapons example is not currently party to an armed conflict, we could call
this example an absence of conditions justifying first-resort killing. For
now, the law happens to call it, more simply, not war.
Indeed, policy critics themselves seem to contemplate a universe in
which ambient violence and group organization are likely to remain part of
a renamed substantive standard for killing. Hakimi, for instance, suggests
that a focus on principles rather than (armed conflict or not) frameworks
could lead to a standard requiring the decision-maker to inquire (in our
scenario) whether the biologist poses an “[a]ctive, serious threat of deadly
force.”120 In our biological weapons scientist example, there seems little
question that the threat could be deadly if realized. Is the threat “active”?
Is it “serious”? To answer these questions, one might want to know
whether the threat was temporally “imminent” in a traditional self-defense
117. Hakimi, supra note 10, at 1385 (“[F]ocusing on the domain question undermines
substantive resolution.”).
118. See 2016 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at ¶ 429 (“In order for a non-State armed
group to be sufficiently organized to become a Party to a non-international armed conflict, it must
possess organized armed forces. Such forces…must possess a certain level of hierarchy and discipline
and the ability to implement the basic obligations of IHL.”).
119. See Seth Lazar, Necessity in Self-Defense and War, 40 P HIL. & PUB. AFF. 27 (2012) (“The
epistemic situation of combatants in war is quite different from that of individual self-defenders in
domestic society…what information they have is generally either unreliable or ambiguous…[and] it is
near-impossible for their adversaries to discriminate among them according to their individual
contributions and responsibility.”).
120. Hakimi, supra note 10, at 1391.
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sort of way. But one would almost certainly also want to know whether the
terrorist group is organized enough to pull off a biological attack, and
indeed whether the group has ever successfully attacked any other target in
the past. Indeed, one would surely want to know as much as possible
about the nature of the threat before deciding on a course of action – up
to and including exactly those things about the threat that would establish
whether it was part of an armed conflict or not.
It is at this point tempting to ask why the threats that most concern
the policy critics – threats posed by loosely affiliated groups or individuals
operating carrying out geographically and temporally isolated attacks,
perhaps using particularly powerful or novel weapons – should be viewed
as mostly a problem for armed conflict law at all. Many human rights
scholars and advocates have, after all, long maintained that general
application of the law of armed conflict to the problem of international
terrorism is a significant category error itself.121 Terrorism (and drug
trafficking and weapons proliferation and more) have long been dealt with
through a host of other available legal authorities, from domestic and
transnational criminal law, to trade and export control regimes, to
international monitoring systems, to national rights of self-defense. Of
course armed conflict law is an ill-fitting cloak for the contemporary
threats about which the policy critics worry because those threats, however
threatening, are not meant to be covered by armed conflict law by
definition. It is only the United States’ uniquely broad application of IHL
to address the threat of international terrorism that has made what should
be mostly a policy discussion about how these threats should be managed, a
discussion about inadequacies in armed conflict law. Perhaps it is the case
as a policy matter that existing state authorities are inadequate to combat
contemporary threats, but if so, then one might sensibly wonder why such
a problem would not be solved at least as well by developing a whole new
category of legal authorities and regulation, rather than by adapting an
existing legal framework to suit a problem for which it was not designed.
In this respect, the argument that the armed conflict framework is not
useful in evaluating the justness of killing in situations not amounting to an
armed conflict reads uncomfortably much like an argument that a hammer
is not useful in evaluating whether a soup needs more salt.
But it is precisely the critics’ attention to the ill-fittingness of the
“armed conflict” framework to new kinds of threats that makes it seem
likely that a key part of what is animating the policy critique is, indeed,
policy: that is, an intuition that many contemporary threats are close enough
to circumstances of armed conflict, or so otherwise dangerous, that the
121. See David Luban, The War on Terrorism and the End of Human Rights, 22 P HIL. & PUB. POL’ Y
9 (2002).
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law should permit some regulated form of killing in those situations,
provided that certain later-to-be-determined substantive and procedural
conditions are met. While there is no evidence of an armed conflict given
in our example of the former state bioweapons scientist aligned with a
terrorist organization, a reasonable person might well view this situation as
one in which moral or policy concerns should make killing permissible if
no other option is, say, “feasible,” to prevent the threat from advancing.122
On this reading, the “armed conflict” threshold is the subject of criticism
on the grounds that it does not just obscure where the lawful-killing line
should be drawn, it draws the line in the wrong place.
Yet rather than engaging such a normative discussion directly, the
policy critics for the most part ascribe the failing to systemic deficiencies:
the “armed conflict” regime and the international legal system as it stands
is incapable of timely bringing contemporary policy insights into effect.123
Given the clarity of the policy need for change, the critique implies, we
should not be surprised that states are finding ways to circumvent legal
standards that are in fact entirely outmoded or irrelevant. Given the
failings of the international system, sketched in terms strikingly similar to
those levied in the decades immediately following World War II, the real
explanation for why the “armed conflict” threshold has remained as it is
must be that the system has made it structurally too hard to change it.
Yet if the post-World War II era in international legal development has
demonstrated anything, it is IHL’s relatively robust capacity, through
formal and informal mechanisms, to account for change. State parties to
the Geneva Conventions have twice negotiated Additional Protocols to
the 1949 treaties, Protocols which were subsequently adopted by the
substantial majority of states.124 Decisional law from international and
domestic courts has further refined treaty rules in ways that have won
broad interjurisdictional acceptance, notwithstanding the courts’ lack of
universal jurisdiction in a formal sense.125 When states have perceived a
122. The policy critics certainly highlight analogous examples in illustrating the problem they
perceive. See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 7; Hakimi, supra note 10, at 1404-05 (suggesting that Osama bin
Laden probably should have been lawfully targetable but that existing IHL did not clearly permit it).
123. See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 7, at 253 (faulting the current standard in the absence of more
“robust, responsible, and accountable forms of international governance”); Hakimi, supra note 10, at
1373 (“No overarching framework exists for developing the law within domains…. [the international
legal system] lacks effective tools for determining the correct answers. Inevitably, it leads to disputes
about which domain governs – disputes that, because the system is decentralized, no actor has
unilateral authority to resolve.”).
124. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
125. See supra note 74; see also HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Gov’t 62(2) PD 459,
489 (2006) (Isr.); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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lack of clarity or substantive inequity in particular IHL rules – the
definition of “direct participants in hostilities,” or the applicability of IHL
rules to emerging weapons technologies, for example – the ICRC, NATO,
and other actors have developed informal but rigorous and influential
international processes to help clarify and document emerging principles
of consensus.126 And states collectively of course remain entirely capable
of shifting the rules the old fashioned way – through the development of
contrary state practice over time, as may happen with relative lightning
speed,127 or over a longer period.128
Such mechanisms for change are far from perfect, and while
demonstrably capable of moving reasonably quickly on occasion, at other
times move far more slowly than one might wish. Yet such frustrations fail
categorically to distinguish these international mechanisms for legal change
from domestic lawmaking institutions likewise regularly subject to criticism
on grounds of failing to keep pace with, for example, technological
change.129 Perhaps more important, the mere lack of rule change in this (or
any) legal system gives us no insight, without more, into the reasons for
that lack – whether the rule has not changed because structural hurdles
prevent it, or because, as seems a particularly compelling hypothesis here,
the policy case for change has not proved persuasive to enough actors to
make change happen in a non-unilateral legal system.

V. CONCLUSION
The post-September 11 years have been challenging for IHL in a host
of respects, challenges that have in the past few years manifested
themselves in calls by a series of scholars to revisit the utility of the “armed
conflict” classification as a threshold of legal significance. Yet while the
126. See INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION
DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES U NDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
(2009); TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 39.
127. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sep. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211.
128. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION A GAINST THREATS
AND ARMED ATTACKS 135-71 (2002) (canvassing state practice relevant to the emergence of a norm
supporting the legality of the use of force for humanitarian purposes); Elena Chachko and Ashley
Deeks, Who is on Board with “Unwilling or Unable”?, LAWFARE BLOG (Oct. 10, 2016)
https://www.lawfareblog.com/who-board-unwilling-or-unable (arguing that several states have
embraced an ‘unwilling or unable’ norm for the use of force without state consent).
129. See, e.g., Deborah Pearlstein, Before Privacy, Power: The Structural Constitution and the Challenge of
Mass Surveillance, 9 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 159, 201 (2017) (noting that, as of 2013, the
Executive Branch had issued no comprehensive revision to E.O. 12333, which sets forth guidelines
to protect electronically collected information “concerning U.S. persons,” for nearly thirty years)
(internal citations omitted); Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information
Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 53334 (2013) (providing examples of obsolete provisions from the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986).
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changes to which these scholars respond are without question real and
important – changes that in key respects well pre-date the U.S. response to
the attacks of September 11 – they cannot on their own justify the
abandonment of “armed conflict” as a relevant determinant of the legality
of first-resort killing. More, while critics focus here on challenges of
“armed conflict” law in particular, their substantive critiques depend in
more and less subtle ways on increasingly outmoded, World War II-era
assumptions about the inadequacy of the international legal system writ
large to address them. The problems to which “armed conflict”
classification critics rightly attend – problems of interpretive uncertainty,
law compliance, and social change – are familiar dilemmas in all legal
systems. And while the international legal system remains far from perfect,
it, too, has developed and diversified in ways that make it far more capable
than it was in 1949 to address the common problems of law’s making.

* * *

